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SUMMARY: Concepts such as marginal utility, expected-utility, etc. are severely criticized in some quarters where 
economists are accused of performing mathematical operations in ordinal spaces. Haplessly, economists’ counter-
claims are far from being substantive. This note shows that there exists an order-isomorphism relating preference 
ordering to a substantive set of real numbers and thus obviates the need for a utility index.    
KEYWORDS: Ordinal Spaces, Binary Relation, Poset, Total Pre-ordering, Isomorphisms.  
JEL Classification: D10, D11. 
 
INTRODUCTION:  
In a few recent papers, Barzilai (2010, 2011, 2013) reminds us that on ordinal spaces (non Euclidean) only relations 
are defined and, therefore, all elementary mathematical operations are inapplicable, including concepts of algebra and 
calculus. Thus, if norms, metrics, derivatives, convexity concepts, etc. are undefined in ordinal spaces, then ordinal 
utility functions are not differentiable. Consequently, works on decision theory by von Neumann and Morgenstern 
(1944), Pareto (1971), Hicks (1946), Samuelson (1948), and Debreu (1954) are based on fundamental errors. So stated, 
Barzilai then accuses these economists and their followers of misidentifying mathematical spaces, and of drawing 
erroneous conclusions such as the derivation of individual demand functions and their properties from constrained 
utility maximization.  
Katzner (2014) took issue with these claims, arguing in return that Barzilai’s criticism is founded on the general notion 
of ordinality arising out of the mathematical theory of measurement. The theory of consumer demand in economic 
theory, he argues, is based on a different notion of ordinal utility, which is independent of the mathematical theory of 
measurement. Thus according to Katzner, whether it is possible to measure utility ordinally or cardinally has to do 
with the kind of scale upon which the elements of the function values of the utility functions are measured. In other 
words, the ordering of baskets of commodities is used to construct a scale on which utility is measured in utils, say. 
Katzner next assumes that under certain technical restrictions (not specified), there exists an ordinal scale to measure 
utility. In Katzner’s words (2014, 2):  
“Assume that some ordering relation orders the objects of [the set] A by pleasure. Under certain technical 
restrictions on that ordering, there exists an ordinal scale for measuring pleasure. When a utility function is 
present and when its function values are taken to be ordinally measured in this sense, the functions map 
baskets of commodities into measured pleasure recorded as quantities of utils.”  
The nebulosity of that argument stretches the confusion. The economist uses the observed preference ordering to 
construct a utility scale. Then on p. 3, Katzner states that the utility function values have no intrinsic meaning other 
than the information they provide concerning preferences already observed. One finds the same reasoning in Hicks 
(1946, 4-19) and in Varian who writes (1978, 81):  
“In classical economic theory, one often summarizes a consumer’s behavior by means of a [n unobservable] 
utility function ….”  
And a few lines below:  
“A utility function is often a very convenient way to describe preferences, but it should not be given any 
psychological interpretation. The only relevant feature of a utility function is its ordinal character.”  
Confusion abounds. Utility functions summarize consumer behavior. Utility functions describe preferences but their 
relevant feature is their ordinal character. Yet we perform mathematical operations on them despite their ordinal char-
acter.  
Barzilai’s argument focuses on the fact that von Neumann and Morgenstern have built a scale to measure preference 
and next seem to equate preference and utility. Thus they failed to present an order-monomorphism from preference 
to something real on which mathematical operations could be performed. In that connection, notions such as expected 
utility and constrained maximization via the Lagrangian method are devoid of substance. Katzner too failed to touch 
on this crucial element. Instead, he refers the reader to another source for technical restrictions.  
The purpose of this note is first clarify both the claims of Barzilai and the counterclaims of Katzner, and next to show 
that the needed isomorphism exists; therefore, the whole notion of utility is vacuous.  
PRELIMINARIES  
Terminology and symbols may vary from author to author, but concepts and properties do not give rise to controver-
sies. For tractability, therefore, we begin by defining our main terms. And since the properties of the relation of order 
are standard, we will state them without proof.   
Poset: is a partially ordered consumption set, say, X whose elements are x, y ,z, …. 
Binary relation: A binary relation R on a set X is a subset of the Cartesian product, denoted: (X, R)  X x X. A binary 
relation R on a set X is a partial order if it satisfies: ∆x  R; R ∩R-1  ∆x, and R 。R  R. And it is a quasi-order if 
it satisfies: ∆x ∩R = Ø; R ∩R-1  ∆x, and R 。R  R. 
Diagonal of X: The diagonal of X is denoted: ∆x = {(x, x) x  X}.   
Inverse of R: The inverse of R is denoted: R-1 = {(y, x) (x, y)  R.  
Total Preorder: A total preorder on X, denoted (X, ≾), is a preorder such that if (x, y)  X, then (x ≾ y)  (y ≾ x)  
(x ~ y). If (X, ≾) is a preorder, then (x ≺ y)  (x ≾ y) ∧ ¬ (y ≾ x); if (x ~ y)  (x ≾ y)  (y ≾ x). 
If a preorder is antisymmetric, we have: x ≲ y  y ≲ x ⇔ x = y, then it is a poset. 
Ordinal Space: An ordinal space is a set such as X on which only the relations of order and equivalence are defined.   
We will now focus on the properties of the relations of order and equivalence.   
The Quasi-order Relation satisfies1: 
i) ∆x ∩R = Ø; 
ii) R∩R-1  ∆x ;  
iii) R 。R  R.  
That is, the Quasi-order relation is irreflexive, antisymmetric, and transitive. If it is reflexive, then it is a poset. The 
equivalence relation, on the other hand, satisfies:  
iv) ∆x  R;  
v) R = R-1;  
vi) R 。R  R.  
Thus, the main difference between the two relations is that the quasi-order relation is irreflexive, and antisymmetric; 
the poset is reflexive and antisymmetric, while the equivalence relation is reflexive, symmetric, and transitive.  
Remark 1: In a poset on a set X, the following relations are defined as follows: ≼ is the inverse of ≽; ≺ is the inverse 
of ≻. Further, if x ≼ y, then x ≺ y  y = x; if x ≺ y, then x ≼ y ∧ x  y; if x ≳ y, then y ≼ x; 
and if x ≻ y, then y ≺ x.  
THE RESULT   
 It follows that if the pair (X, ≾) is a total preorder on X that is antisymmetric2 ), it is then said to be representable if 
there is a function : X  , also denoted order isomorphism if  is a bijection and order preserving. Put differently, 
(x  y) if and only if (x)  (y). Since  is one-to-one, if follows that (x < y) if and only if (x) <  (y). However, 
                                                          
1 See Stanat and McAllister (1977), Rosen (1999). See also: www.cs.odu/-nerzic/content/relation/eq-relation/eq-
relation/eq-relation.rtml. A quasi-order is a poset if the relation  is antisymmetric. Pequignot (2015) defies two ele-
ments x and y of a quasi-order, which is reflexive and transitive, as equivalent if both x  y and y  x hold. He then 
declares that x and y are equivalent while y  x. Moreover, x and y are not comparable when both x ≱y and y ≱ x. 
Then an embedding between two such quasi-orders becomes an equivalence.   
2 That is ∆x ∩ R = Ø. 
such a  exists almost surely if (R ∩R-1)  ∆x; in such a case  is an order isomorphism from X into , where  is 
the real line.  
Put differently, for every element x  X,  a   such that (x, a)  R. Then  is a function. Let ≼x and ≼ be partial 
orders on the sets X and , respectively,   : X  , then  is increasing if and only if x ≼x y ⟺ (x) ≼  (y). 
The two partially ordered sets (X, ≼x) and (, ≼) are said to be isomorphic if there exists a one-to-one  from 
X to  such that x ≼X y () if and only if (x) ≼ (y), x, y  X.  If x ≺x y, then by definition  (x) ≼  (y). But if 
 (x) =  (y), then x = y since  is one-to-one; this is a contradiction because by antisymmetry x R y  y R x, but x  
y. Hence,  (x) ≺  (y).  
We are then claiming the following: 
Claim 1: Let X and  be sets satisfying ii), then  an isomorphic relation between them3.  
Claim 2: If X and  are sets that are relationally isomorphic, then the following statements are    equivalent: 
               : X   is an injective function. 
               And -1:  X is a surjective function4,5.  
This result can now be expressed more formally as:  
                     {ΛX ΛR ((X, ≾) satisfies i) – vi) V V : X    (0, 1)  (R ∩ R-1)  ∆x },  
where  is the set of the shares of the budget of the consumer as revealed in equilibrium. To my knowledge and up to 
now, the economics profession has only alluded to the existence of . Yet it is easily seen that  maps the preference 
ordering into the budget share’s set , observable in equilibrium.  
 The construction of a utility index presents other complications too. As utility functions must be differentiable with 
a convex hypograph, then continuity and strict convexity are arbitrarily imposed on consumer preference. However, 
this result obviates the need to impose conditions on a concept whose underlining mechanism is not even known. As 
far as we know, the origin of a consumer’s preference may be genetical, cultural, psychological, or dependent on the 
consumers’ information sets to some extent, or a combination of all of these. The reason why the consumer prefers x 
to y, say, is of little importance next to the information revealed in the distribution of his or her budget.  
This result also obviates the need to do mathematical operations where they are undefined, and even obviates the need 
to appeal to an unobservable utility function.    
                                                          
3 For a proof see Warner (1965) 
4 For a proof, see Karolyi (2016). 
5 See, Remark 2 below.  
Remark 2: The pair (X  , ) satisfies: h) ∆x  R; i) R ∩R-1  ∆x; and j) R 。R  R. The pair (X , <) satisfies: k) R 
∩R-1  ∆x; l) R 。R  R; and l) ∆x ∩R = Ø. The pair (X , =) satisfies: m) ∆x  R; n) R = R-1; o) 
R ∩R-1  ∆x, and p) R 。R  R.  
For more on these, the reader is referred to Campion et al. (2012, p.2-3). It should also be noted that the relation  on 
X can be reversed. For example, if (x  y)  (x < y), one can write (y  x)  (y > x).  
Finally, our result underlines the difference in claims by different authors. For example, for Varian, (1978, 80-81), the 
order relation is complete, reflexive and transitive. In Takayama (1986, 176-183), the order relation is reflexive and 
transitive. Layard and Walters (1978, 124-125) simply assume that goods are infinitely divisible so that they can assign 
real numbers to the ordering. I do not know whether or not Varian realizes the enormity of the demand he is putting 
on consumers to linearly order their preference. Layard and Walters, on the other hand, exclude most goods from 
exchange without making a dent in the problem at hand. The property of antisymmetry is nowhere mentioned, yet it 
a fundamental property for R to be a functional. Even the pair (X , ) is reflexive, antisymmetric and transitive. 
Hopefully the above result will contribute to a needed clarification of the issue.  
INDIVIDUAL DEMAND FUNCTION 
Consider now a market with m consumers, n goods, where each consumer possesses n endowments (). The best 
approach is to fix supply and examine the demand side. In equilibrium, consumer i devotes a share  of his or her 
budget (B) to good j. Then:  
                                  xi*j = ij Bi /pj = ij ij + (ij nkj pk k) /pj,   pj > 0, j  n. 
The instantaneous price elasticity (η) at the equilibrium point, is:  
                                            η =  xi*pj / pj xi* = - (ij k pk ik) /pj xi*j < 0;  
and for any small increment e around xi* (η < 0). Hence, one can infer that there is an inverse relationship between 
price and quantity and that, at the observed equilibrium quantity demanded, price elasticity is negative. A demand 
function exists almost surely, but only a point on the demand curve is observable. Yet, it can easily be seen that at the 
equilibrium point income elasticity and cross price elasticity are both positive. Further, the price elasticity of expensive 
goods (that absorb a significant share of the budget) tend to be relatively low (inelastic), while that of cheaper goods 
tend to be elastic. As income elasticity is positive, this simple mechanism of exchange also shows that real growth is 
constrained by resource availability. Thus, the demand side of the market process reduces to consumers’ effort to map 
their preference orderings to real-valued sets, under the constraint of their budget. Therefore, nothing can be said about 
continuity and marginal rate of substitution in this set-up.   
At the equilibrium point: Qj = im xj*i is possible, and per force Walras’s Law holds as a zero excess demand is 
observed. But elsewhere, excess demand for any good j is undefined. Hence, a community excess demand function is 
also unobservable.  
Obviously, this result is valid in a linear world, i. e. in pure exchange, the equilibrium is unique and stable. In real 
non-linear (due to feedbacks), non-ergodic, and uncertain settings, multiple equilibria are to be expected (Debreu, 
1970; Sonnenschein (1972), among others); however, this is left for further research. In the meantime, it is easily seen 
that revealed preference is just that; hence to assume that it reconciles demand theory and unobservable utility function 
is not justified.            
CONCLUSION  
Barzilai’s criticism is very useful in the sense that it forces economists to be more specific about a real-value set () 
on which mathematical operations are defined, and it obviates the need for a utility index as shown in McKensie 
(1957) and Dominique (2008). 
In this regard, it is instructive to return to the correspondence between Léon Walras and Henri Poincaré to show that 
the problem with a utility index is a recurrent one. According to Ingrao and Isreael (1990), after receiving many 
criticisms from scientists for doing mathematical operations on an unmeasurable satisfaction function, Walras sent a 
copy of his Elements to Poincaré asking for an endorsement. Poincaré in essence told Walras that he saw nothing 
wrong with Walras’ attempt to measure an unmeasurable magnitude as long as there exists a measurable magnitude 
that is positively correlated with satisfaction, perhaps as the quantity of heat contained in a body can be mapped into 
the height of a column of mercury. But, once a proxy function is found, he (Walras) should no longer mention the 
unmeasurable magnitude. However, Walras never provide the needed isomorphism in question. On the contrary, as 
Jaffé (1965) reports, Walras wrote to his followers that he had the support of a great scientist to perform mathematical 
operations on the concept of satisfaction (utility).   
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